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The British agents‟ movement against the Iranian government was started seriously after nationalization 
of oil on March 20, 1951/Esfand 29, 1329 in Iran. Their continuous plan and action to bring down Dr. 
Mohammad Mosaddeq‟s government was invariably confirmed. Although they took several actions to 
remove him from power, however, they failed even in their plan to assassinate him on February 28, 
1953/Esfand 9, 1331. The present study investigates one of the British plots, to murder General Maḥmūd 
Afshār Ṭūs, Police Chief, with the intention of making 
 
Mosaddeq’s government powerless. Qualitative approach has been applied to achieve the stated aim of 
this article. Documents from Public Record Office, United Kingdom, are the main primary sources used to 
manifest this contentious issue. This turn of event brought about nervous, insecurity, internal 
oppositions and counter-opposition by different groups inside Iran. To conclude, it highlights that the 
purpose of that assassination was to spread negative propaganda - inefficiency of Mosaddeq‟s 
government. It thus reveals that the plotters could obtain a substantial excuse for their further 










The significance of Iran geopolitics location in the region was raised the political changes in Iran by the 
western countries, Britain in particular. Its importance was further enhanced by the appearance of 
natural resources, particularly oil wealth. During the Cold War, nationalism took place in Iran in two 
inter-related aspects; politics and economy. Meanwhile, various groups and political parties either 
religious or non-religious were shaped demanding social justice, democracy, nationalization and reform. 
Gradually, informing people highlighted their active attendance in the society. Those nationalism 
sentiments and the liberalism eagerness caused people to approach Mosaddeq’s viewpoints. He was one 
of the leaders to establishment of National Front. In 1949, he took the advantage and got going his 
unique action in a bid to nationalize Iran’s oil. Then, some of the Majlis deputies, Mosaddeq in particular, 




Subsequently, Mosaddeq unveiled a plan to the Majlis. Regarding that, giving any oil‟s exclusive 
concession or privilege to foreigners, except its selling, was stopped. Mosaddeq‟s ultimate aim was to 
free Iran economically from all type of prolong control of the British. One of his hidden agenda also was 
to built a new Iran; a democratic state. On March 20, 1951/ Esfand 29, 1329, oil was nationalized in the 
whole country. Soon, Mosaddeq became a prime minister. Iran society encountered with many 
destructions and inappropriate circumstances. The British did not give up and and did not want to lose 
one of their massive assets. They gave several destructive demonstrations against the Iranian 
government. In fact, all of the British efforts and conspiracies to overthrow Mosaddeq failed. (Ebrahimi & 
others, 2012) For instance, one of their plots, the event of February28, 1953, provided the situation in 
purpose of killing Mosaddeq who, fortunately, emerged unscathed from the place. Therefore, the British 
went further to demolish the Iranian government using harsh and inhumane actions. That paved the way 
for a total destruction to the internal politics of Iran. 
 
 
The Infamous Plot to Murder Afshār Ṭūs 
 
The plot to overthrow the government grew out of the inordinate ambition of the British. One of the 
plots of anti-government was kidnapping Police Chief, General Maḥmūd Afshār Ṭūs, on April 20, 1953/ 
Farvardin 31, 1332. (Nahavandi, 2009) The same group planner, which had been involved on the event of 
February 28 again schemed. Simultaneously, the conflict with the government was ignited by Army 
Officers. In fact, at night 20 April, retired officers such as General Abū al-Qāsim Zāhidī, Muzayyinī, 
Munazzah, Bayandor, Major Balūch Qarāʼī, Ḥusayn Khaṭībī, and Agent Deputy Dr. Baqāʼī gathered all 
together at Dr. Baqāʼī‟s home. They were agreed of the above-mentioned plot. At that time, they also 
contacted to Zahedi and suggested kidnapping Afshār Ṭūs. (EP1015/129 (I), May 3, 1953) The next plan 
after kidnapping Afshār Ṭūs was that General Daftarī would be appointed as the head of police. Then, 
Army Staff Chief, Riyāḥī, and Fireign Minister, Dr. Fāṭimī, must be kidnapped. They had supposed, after 
those events, the downfall of the government would ensure, certainly. (EP1015/129 (I), May 3, 1953) 
Their ultimate intention was, definitely, to collapse the government. 
 
However, mysterious disappearance of Afshār Ṭūs made the circumstances upset. The 
opponents started to announce that the government became too weak, and there is no security in the 
society while Police Chief was lost. At that time, some of anti-government claimed that Mosaddeq is not 
capable for establishment of security and pacification. (EP1015/117 (A), April 22, 1953) Kashani was one 
of them. He believed that the reason for disorder was the government and police.( Elm, 1994). 
 
According to British document, “Anti-government newspaper, DAD on April 22 asserts rumor 
disappearance caused by Prime Minister for purpose making further attacks against court.” (EP1015/117 
(A), April 22, 1953) One of the negative propaganda was that Mosaddeq was in charge of colluding with 
Afshār Ṭūs in order to detect the doubtful people who looked after the government and prime minister. 
(EP1015/117, April 23, 1953) 
 
Lots of different analysis of that event had taken place by opponents. Anti-government were 
accusing the government, intentionally. Actually, they knew what the real quest was, because most of 
them had cooperated on that. In spite of those viewpoints, the government believed that kidnapping of 
Afshār Ṭūs was done by “agents British imperialism”, and the action was a deliberate attempt to create 




Doubtless, the government‟s statement was truth. To search, General Sarʹrishtah had been fully 
authorized on a mission to search Afshār Ṭūs. General Sarʹrishtah, by his continuous effort, could 
discover a principal group of plotters in a short time. Some of the suspicious persons such as retired 
General „Alī Aṣghar Muzayyinī and Munazzah and Colonel Davallū were arrested. Some of them such as 
Zahedi and Ḥijāzī were not found. (From Tehran to London, Sent dept 4179 RPTD info London 1381 
pouched Tabriz Isfahan Meshed, April 24, 1953) Later, some others such as Captain Balūch  Qarāʼī,  
Captain  Afshār,  Qarai‟s  cook,  Deputy Dr.  Baqāʼī‟s  servant,  and Mayor Telu were arrested. But, they 
implicated and did not mention any name. ( EP1015/129 (E), April 28, 1953) 
 
Finally, on April 26, 1953/Ordibehesht 6, 1332, the dead body of Afshār Ṭūs was found in Talv 
cave at Lashkarak hills outside Tehran. In connection with the murder, the police discovered the 
perpetrator, and made some arrests such as Ḥusayn Khaṭībī, who was Dr. Baqāʼī‟s associate. That made 
easier to work on the plot. In fact, Dr. Baqāʼī and Khaṭībī had led the group of conspirators. (EP1015/129 
(I), May 3, 1953) Dr. Baqāʼī had been accused of murdering Afshār Ṭūs. Dr. Baqāʼī was “anxious the 
government take away” his parliamentary immunity, (EP1015/129 (I), May 4, 1953) but he vowed to 
bring this matter before the court if the latter took action against him. He had two seats as the Majlis 
deputy-the representative of Kirmān and Tehran. On April 29, 1953/ Ordibehesht 9, 1332, he stated his 
resignation of deputy from Tehran, and after that he would continue only as deputy from Kirmān. 
Presumably, his action was to be far from the capital. Hence, he had an excuse not to join the Majlis 
meeting. It was possible that his action also will give more chance to Tudeh candidate, Fahriver to 
replace him as a representative in the Majlis. (EP1015/128 (H), May 1, 1953) 
 
Besides, Zahedi had gone to the Majlis after he was called up by the commander of the army of 
Tehran on 22nd of April 1953/2nd of Ordibehesht 1332. Zahedi stated that his security was in jeopardy. 
After that, Kashani allowed him to stay in Parliament because of the assassin of the Brigadier Afshār Ṭūs 
who was doubted by Dr. Baqāʼī and Zahedi. Regarding that, the latter sent a letter to Kashani in order to 
stay in the Majlis. Kashani accepted his demand and “gave Zahedi asylum in the Majlis, rebuffing 
Mosaddeq.” (Afkhami, 2008) Kashani also ordered others to treat Zahedi in a very respectful manner 
while he was in Parliament. Zahedi took refuge in the Majlis until 1st of July 1953/10th of Tir 1332 by 
support of Kashani, the Majlis president. That action was the culmination of collaboration between anti-
Mosaddeq and Durbar, Britain and the U.S. At that time, Kashani took effort to protect Zahedi who had 
already chosen as new prime minister, and afterwards, the breaking point came into the society. Of 
course, that was very hard for Iranian people, particularly, for Mosaddeq. 
 
However, the plotters paved the way to make Mosaddeq‟s government weaker. Their argument 
was the government which could not provide security for its personnel, has no efficiency to govern the 
country. Subsequently, the situation in Tehran was not calm at all. The war of nervous which was started 
by the army, affected, adversely, the people‟s feeling. To put salt on the wound, several demonstrations 
were held in support of the government. Thus, anti-government such as Kashani and Ala were scared of 
the population. Their newspaper such as Īrān-i Mā stated the government spread the made-up news in 
regard to numbers of public support, which is not true. They “defended Kashani and Ala while pointing 
out to PM corruption in Government.” (EP1015/128 (B), April 25, 1953) It was a definite accusation 
against the government. It seems that radio announcement had not telling lie. It can be said opponents 
classified the statistics based on their desire. In addition, the atmosphere of chaos was still dominant in 
the Majlis. Groups of dissidents attempted to collapse the Majlis and its constitution. (EP1015/128, April 
24, 1953) For instance, some of them intentionally left the Majlis. The Majlis fraction did not attend to its 
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session in order to discontinue the meeting due to lack of quorum. (EP1015/128, April 24, 1953) 
 
Also, they travelled to Qum which was changed into a centre for anti-Mosaddeq. The same as 
those disruptive means in sessions of the Majlis was done by permission and support of Kashani. They 
were doing a range of measures to set back the Majlis by support of Sarʹkishīkʹzādah, the head of staff 
members of shrine of Ḥazrat-i Ma„ṣūmah. (Interview with Mohammad Ali Amouei, 29th of January 2011) 
Kashani not only believed in himself as the capital of the country, but also thought that all of the Muslims 
all over the world accepted his leadership. “I am a capital of this country. I am not only the leader of 
Iranian Muslims. All of the Muslims in the world accept me as their leader.” (Dihnavī, 1983/1362) 
 
After few days from kidnapping Afshār Ṭūs, the Majlis deputies demanded to cancel Mosaddeq‟s 
plenary power. Some of them such as Ḥāʼirīʹzādah, Mīrʹashrāfī, and Farāmarzī asserted openly that 
plenary power must be taken from Mosaddeq and it must be transferred to the Majlis. They also 
demanded to abolish martial law. (EP1015/128 (D), April 27, 1953) It is worth to say that one day after 
finding the dead body of Afshār Ṭūs, opponents in the Majlis repeated insistently their request to cancel 
flawlessly the government‟s power. The oppositions‟ effort was awfully coordinated in such a way that 
the government would not be able to concentrate on their later plot. Among them, Ḥāʼirīʹzādah was 
continuing his effort to boycott the Majlis. (EP1015/128 (I), May 4, 1953) But, he did not succeed. 
Regarding that event, the coup supporters had promised Dr. Baqāʼī to elect him as the next prime 
minister. (EP1015/129 (I), May 3, 1953) However, Dr. Baqāʼī fell over backwards in support of the issues 
that would get premiership. That promise was just pie in the sky. The coup supporters attempted to push 
ahead with their programmes i.e., to choose Zahedi as new prime minister. 
 
In response to the opponents‟ activities, the National Front asked the government to suppress 
the faction in a cruel and harsh manner, and to use its legal power in progress of events, satisfactorily. 
The desire of its members was to punish conspirators without any respect to their position. (EP1015/128 
(A), April 23, 1953) Despite all of those hardships, unfortunately, Mosaddeq turned a deaf ear to the 
requests and the message of danger from his loyal entourages and companions. 
 
Additionally, Dr. Fāṭimī, Minister of Foreign Affairs, in interview with Henderson, declared that 
the Shah should change his attitude because the government has no intention to remove his majesty. 
Dr. Fāṭimī believed that if coup will happen, a civil war will not be avoided. It follows that, the National 
Front would certainly be victorious and the Shah would be overthrown. Obviously, “if the Shah 
maintained his present attitude, Fatemi himself, like other national movement leaders, would no longer 
owe his allegiance.” (EP1015/128, April 27, 1953) Hence, the conflict between the shah and government 
was disclosed, seriously, although Dr. Fāṭimī continuously, was attempting to show the situation is calm. 
He asserted that “despite difficulties government has not neglected national interests for one moment.” 
(EP1015/127, April 27, 1953) 
 
Furthermore, opponents were struggling since long time ago to act against Mosaddeq by 
rumours concerning his nerves. (EP1015/42, February 19, 1953) They wanted to show that Mosaddeq is 
a madman, but they failed in that accusation. They spread another rumours against him after the 
disappearance of Afshār Ṭūs. This time, rumours “have been circulating about the death or resignation of 
Musaddiq.” 
 
(EP1015/117 (E), Minutes by A. K. Rothnie, April 24, 1953) The main purpose was 




(EP1015/117 (E), Minutes by A. K. Rothnie, April 24, 1953) Action taken by the British at that time was 
injustice and only for the achievement of their goal. 
 
 
Mosaddeq’s Last Strategy 
 
On the strength of the Authority Law, Mosaddeq announced on July 21/Tir 30 as a public holiday. At 9 
pm of July 20/Tir 29, he sent his message to the Iranian society through Rādiyu Millat (Millat Radio), and 
reminded the memory of July 21, 1952 disturbance. He pointed out the problems, sanctions, the 
challenges and the barriers that had been formed because of international policies and related them as 
the reasons of the pressure and narrow circumstances that the government had to undergo. He 
reminded that the Iranian people did not allow him leaving the government. (Iṭilā‘āt Newspaper, 22nd of 
July 1953/31st of Tir 1332) 
 
Unfortunately, the majority of deputies were not attending in the Majlis‟ meetings because they were 
not able to make decision. On June17/ Khordad 27, the National Front invited the people to attend the 
meeting which was aimed to report the Majlis‟ performance and the problems caused by the minority in 
the Majlis. All the National-related parties welcomed the invitation. In that chaotic atmosphere, 
however, the Majlis was changed into a biggest centre for oppositions. Mosaddeq was looking to find a 
way to control it. He decided for dissolution of the Majlis through referendum. (Kūhistānīʹnizhād, 
2004/1383) The Majlis which was set up by Mosaddeq, was going to disband by himself. 
 
Mosaddeq believed that the national government failed to gather sufficient and solid determined 
supporters in the seventeenth Majlis. (Kūhistānīʹnizhād, 2004/1383) Also, there was no integration and 
unity among the members of the National Front fraction. For instance, Makkī who was one of the 
National Front‟s members was involving to provoke the people against Dr. Mosaddeq. At that time, 
instigation plots by the British and Durbar had been revealed to Mosaddeq. His long background in 
political affairs made him to take a decision to disperse the Majlis. He knew well almost all of the Majlis 
deputies. From his point of view, relying on the seventeenth Majlis caused wishes for the Iranians‟ 
prosperity would be over. Mosaddeq had his own reason in dissolving the Majlis, and insisted on that. In 
fact, since a green light was given to premiership of Qavām by the seventeenth Majlis, its handling was 
brought discredit on Mosaddeq‟s eyes. The events after that, for example, the parliamentary 
obstructions of Kashani, Dr. Baqāʼī, and Ḥāʼirīʹzādah in particular, also, the plot on 28th of February in 
purpose of destroying Dr. Mosaddeq , were the most important reasons, in his viewpoint, to believe 
those were consequences of the action took by some of the Majlis deputies. Obviously since his national 
democratic transformation was given freedom for political activities, Mosaddeq encountered with 
oppositions of the National Front‟s members. 
 
Mosaddeq expressed significantly his aims with representing the government‟s issues and its recourse to 
referendum. He initially mentioned about opponents‟ seditious in the Majlis and the event of February 
28, 1953. Next, he clarified plots and insults done against him. The critical point addressed by him was 
the event of murdering Afshār Ṭūs. Its consequence was the worst scenario because its plan makers such 
as Zahedi and Dr. Baqāʼī took cover in the Majlis by Kashani‟s help. Then, Mosaddeq said: 
 
“There are few people among today‟s opposition group who have been accompanying the 
National Front from the beginning. However, it is preferred not to mention the reasons for which they 
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have left the people in the last stages of our victory. In weakening the government and preventing the 
accomplishment of people‟s dreams, they even exceeded the known old time enemies. In the present 
Majlis, a group of oppositions and the supporters of the foreigner countries together with some people 
who deviated from their original ideas are trying to deliver Iran‟s affair to a government which is able to 
fulfil their and foreign governments‟ interest. Unfortunately, they are abusing the Majlis‟ rostrum as the 
tool for spreading their harmful proclamations. In the democratic countries, there is no law at a higher 
position than people‟s determination. This is why, in such a sensitive historical moment, the government 
is informing the society about the problem which is being confronted with. Regarding the Majlis, it is 
inquired from the people if they agree to continue the current Majlis‟ condition until the legal 
termination period of the seventeenth Majlis, another government which is able to collaborate with the 
Majlis will be formed. Or, if people agree with the current government, its plans and aims, they could 
vote on dissolving the Majlis to let a new one be formed that will be accompanying and more 
cooperative with the government in achieving people‟s goals and wishes.”( Iṭilā‘āt Newspaper, 27th of 
July 1953/5th of Mordad 1332) 
 
Mosaddeq hoped that these new deputies will give full support and cooperation with the current 
government for the betterment of the people. Mosaddeq, democratically, proposed referendum and set 
forth a question, either the Majlis or the government, from the people. He applied a principle by 
referring to the people under the central core of the referendum, and also asking them about differences 
with Durbar, the Majlis, and the government. His revolutionary movement was a realistic initiative that 
brought his ideas closer to democracy. He was a politician who found the secret of victory. However, his 
idea created a long distance between him and the majority members of the National Front. They 
disagreed  with the principle of Mosaddeq‟s parliamentary procedure. Thus, they could not propose any 
other way for solving the issue to him. The reason was that they together with majority of the Majlis 
deputies as well as Kashani were in agreement almost in a same desire of protecting the interest of the 
Shah and imperialist.The opponents‟   will   was   to   overthrow   the   national   government. 
Courageously, Mosaddeq did not succumb himself to that. On the other hands, the people by all 
of their efforts and gathering in front of the Majlis were unlikely to get the eight-point bill through within 
the lifetime of that Majlis. Mosaddeq definitely was defeated in establishing the seventeenth Majlis 
based on national desires. Some of the Majlis deputies such as Dr. Baqāʼī, Makkī, and Ḥāʼirīʹzādah 
prevented even of holding the Majlis public sessions. Finally, in that unpredictable situation, there was 
no way to solve this deadlock except referendum – to disband the Majlis in which was under control of 
the Shah and imperialists‟ desire. 
 
Although Mosaddeq apparently was happy from the result, however, he knew foreign spies were 
ready to defeat his national goals. This action logically stood out against all foreign political destructive 
attempts. His decision to do referendum was the best response to that. However, the Shah claimed that 
referendum was a rigged election. 
 
Mosaddeq‟s answer to the Shah‟s declaration was: 
 
“If the Shah of a country does not listen to the voice and the opinion of the whole society, how 
can we expect from the foreign countries not to ignore and abuse us. Such lack of consideration the 
public opinion was the reason that Eden, the Foreign Secretary of Britain, wrote in one of his Diaries that 
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„Iran‟s Nationalism is pre-mature.‟ The governor of each country should first respect people‟s opinion in 
order to protect the whole society‟s interest and benefits from the foreigners. 
 
Otherwise, choosing a different attitude will make the Shah of the country be dependent on the foreign 




Mosaddeq also mentioned: 
 
“It was not hidden to everybody that the representatives of Tehran, with an exceptional record, 
had been chosen by the majority votes of the people of this city. 
 
Most of Tehran‟s representatives belonged to the National Front, however, they changed their attitude 
due to the negative influence of some foreign countries. They became enemies with my government and 
such influence was also transmitted to the representatives of other cities in the Majlis.” (Muṣaddiq, 
2007/1385) 
 
However, in the last part, the referendum had a reverse consequence, and became a major reason for 
Mosaddeq‟s downfall. That was predictable because of the absence of nationalists and the Majlis 
deputies who were anti-Mosaddeq, also Kashani who announced attending in election was „Ḥarām‟. 
Evidently, Mosaddeq was going to win to establish the new Majlis in favour of Iranians‟ needs and 
requires based on his national aims. However, Mosaddeq was struggling with his stern foreign opponent. 
In fact, by the dissolution of the Majlis, unfortunately, Mosaddeq himself paved the way to demise his 




At this juncture, we may suggest that the British and its allies not only were successful in their attempt to 
create havoc in the government, but also managed to initiate misunderstanding between Mosaddeq and 
his National Front‟s members. The killing of Afshār Ṭūs turned out affairs from bad to worse. That 
conspiracy was done to make Mosaddeq‟s government weaker. Hence, the British strategy was never 
abated in order to achieve their ultimate goal i.e., to overthrow Mosaddeq hitherto with some 
difficulties. Undoubtedly, the British programmers together with oppositions inside the country played a 
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